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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes on before this court on an appeal by 
the Government from an order entered November 30, 1999, 
dismissing an indictment of the defendant, Joseph Dees, 
charging him with unauthorized use of access devices to 
obtain money, goods, and services aggregating more than 
$1,000 in value in a one-year period, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1029(a)(2) ("section 1029(a)(2)"). The district court 
dismissed the indictment on Dees's motion as it agreed 
with him that the statute of limitations barred the 
prosecution. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. S 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3731. See 18 U.S.C. S 3282. We exercise plenary review 
on this appeal. See United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 
123 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 618 (1999). 
 
The indictment charged that from March 24, 1994, 
through on or about July 29, 1994, Dees used access 
devices, i.e., credit cards, "to obtain money, goods, and 
services aggregating more than $1,000 in value, within a 
one-year period; said offense affecting interstate commerce." 
The Government proposes to prove three purchases in 
support of the charge: (1) an automobile purchase of 
$6,368.20 on March 24, 1994; (2) a chair purchase of 
$2,000 on March 25, 1994; and (3) a cellular telephone 
purchase of $100 on July 29, 1994. 
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In moving to dismiss the indictment on statute of 
limitations grounds Dees pointed out that section 
1029(a)(2) provides: 
 
       whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud 
       traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access 
       devices during any one-year period, and by such 
       conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 
       or more during that period . . . shall, if the offense 
       affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished. 
       . . . 
 
Dees argued that inasmuch as the grand jury returned the 
indictment on July 22, 1999, 18 U.S.C. S 3282, which 
states that, except as otherwise provided by law or in a 
capital offense, an indictment must be found "within five 
years next after such offense shall have been committed," 
barred the prosecution. He contended that the first two 
purchases constituted offenses in themselves completed 
more than five years before the indictment was returned, as 
these purchases each exceeded the $1,000 threshold in 
section 1029(a)(2). Accordingly, there could have been a 
separate indictment for each of those purchases. Thus, he 
contended that their prosecution in the three-purchase 
indictment was barred. In his view, it therefore followed 
that the indictment had to be dismissed because hisfinal 
use of a credit card did not enable him to obtain a thing 
equaling $1,000 or more in value. 
 
The district court granted the motion on the theory that 
the original two purchases were not within the five-year 
period before the return of the indictment. It thus held that 
"the only fraudulent act that is timely for purposes of this 
statute of limitations occurred on July 29, 1999, and this 
use does not satisfy the statutory minimum of $1,000." The 
court did not suggest that its result might have been 
different if the first two purchases in themselves did not 
result in Dees obtaining something aggregating $1,000 or 
more in value. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
We will reverse for the following reasons. Section 
1029(a)(2) provides that the offense constitutes the use of 
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the access device "during any one-year period" to obtain 
anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more. (Emphasis 
added.) Inasmuch as there is no cap on the value of 
individual transactions within the one-year period which 
can be aggregated to reach the $1,000 threshold, it is 
simply beyond doubt that the indictment properly charged 
a violation for a period ending within five years prior to the 
return of the indictment. Therefore, laying aside Dees's 
assertion of a statute of limitations defense, there would be 
no reason for a court to dismiss the indictment. While we 
do not doubt that the Government could have obtained 
separate indictments for the first two transactions, that 
circumstance does not in any way detract from the 
conclusion that all three transactions could be prosecuted 
in a single indictment. See United States v. King, 200 F.3d 
1207, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1999) (even though individual 
fraudulent banking transactions in a bank scheme can be 
charged separately, they can be charged in one indictment 
which will not thereby be duplicitous). It therefore follows 
that the offense as actually charged was completed July 29, 
1994, the date of the last purchase, and, as the statute of 
limitations started running at that time, the court should 
have denied Dees's motion to dismiss as the indictment was 
returned on July 22, 1999, a date within five years of July 
29, 1994. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 
90 S.Ct. 858, 860 (1970). 
 
We, of course, recognize that a distinction for statute of 
limitation purposes could be made between the situation 
here and that in which the first two purchases were for less 
than $1,000 in the aggregate, in which event only with the 
third purchase could the $1,000 threshold be met. In that 
circumstance, surely the offense could not be complete 
until the third purchase was made, and thus if the third 
purchase was within five years of the indictment, the 
indictment on any theory would be timely. But this 
distinction from the circumstances here does not matter 
because as we have emphasized already, Congress has 
defined the offense as obtaining "anything of value 
aggregating $1,000 or more during" any one-year period. 
Congress, however, did not provide that any particular 
transaction within the one-year period had to be of any 
particular amount. Nor did it provide that if a transaction 
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in itself exceeded the $1,000 threshold, the transaction 
could not be aggregated with later transactions so as to 
constitute a single offense. We, of course, will not write 
such an exception to the plain language of section 
1029(a)(2) into the law. Therefore, we conclude that 
inasmuch as the offense is defined as activity"during any 
one-year period," the offense is complete as to any one-year 
period when there is or are unauthorized uses of access 
devices, and the aggregated value of things obtained 
through the use of those access devices within the one-year 
period ending on its last day equaled or exceeded $1,000. 
Thus, at that time the offense will be completed for that 
period and the statute of limitations will start to run. See 
Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. at 860. 
 
While we reach our conclusion on the basis of the clear 
language of section 1029(a)(2), we point out that our result 
is certainly not unfair to Dees. As we have made clear, it 
could not be argued successfully that if the $1,000 
threshold would have been met only by inclusion of the 
third purchase that this action would be barred. Indeed, in 
his brief Dees in effect agrees with the point as he in part 
relies on the fact that the first two purchases constituted 
complete offenses in themselves. 
 
We also point out that in Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114-15, 90 
S.Ct. at 860, the Court indicated that a statute of 
"limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to 
defend themselves against charges when the basic facts 
may have become obscured by the passage of time and to 
minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts 
in the far-distant past." If, as we believe is beyond doubt, 
this prosecution would have been timely if the third 
purchase had been necessary for the $1,000 threshold to 
have been met, we do not comprehend how Dees has been 
prejudiced merely because the first two purchases were for 
more than $1,000 in themselves. Surely it would not be 
thought that a person engaging in transactions possibly 
involving the use of an unauthorized access device keeps 
records taking into account whether individual transactions 
did or did not exceed the $1,000 threshold, retaining 
records longer for transactions not equaling the threshold. 
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It also is important to recognize that our result does not 
mean that a defendant must guard against being 
prosecuted for stale transactions. After all, inasmuch as the 
one-year period will close with the last transaction charged, 
the elements of the offense cannot include transactions 
more than one year prior to the last transaction charged in 
the indictment, and that transaction must be withinfive 
years of the return of the indictment.1  
 
In reaching our result, we have not overlooked our 
opinion in United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893 (3d Cir. 
1994), where we held that there could be multiple 
prosecutions and convictions under section 1029(a)(2) for 
individual transactions within a one-year period equaling or 
exceeding the $1,000 threshold. Id. at 899-901. Our 
conclusion is consistent with Turcks because we did not 
hold in that case that individual transactions could not be 
aggregated and prosecuted in a single case merely because 
they could have been prosecuted individually. 
 
We recognize that the parties in their briefs discuss 
whether a violation of section 1029(a)(2) constitutes a 
"continuing offense." We, however, decide this case without 
the use of such a label which in view of the plain language 
of section 1029(a)(2) can add nothing to our analysis. 
Moreover, we recognize that section 1029(a)(2) is not a 
statute contemplating an indeterminate time period for the 
commission of the offense as is true in a conspiracy case 
which is the "classic example of a continuing offense." See 
United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999). 
Thus, we question whether section 1029(a)(2) should be 
characterized as a statute involving a continuing offense. 
 
Finally, we observe that we are not concerned here with 
a situation in which the Government attempts to use a 
single transaction to establish that a defendant committed 
more than one section 1029(a)(2) offense. It will be time 
enough to address that situation in the unlikely event that 
it ever arises. Moreover, we are not passing on any 
substantive issues that Dees has raised. Rather, we hold 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Thus, this case does not involve the possibility of stale prosecutions 
the court identified in United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 878-79 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
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only the district court should not have dismissed the case 
on the ground that the statute of limitations barred the 
prosecution. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order entered November 
30, 1999, dismissing the indictment will be reversed and 
the matter will be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
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